



- 1. FROM SIDI BOUZID TO REVOLUTION (2011): THE ROLE OF YOUTH
 - ✓ FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE POLITICAL CENTER
 UNDERDEVELOPED GOVERNATORATES → URBAN PERIPHERIES (RURAL EXODUS) → RICHER GOVERNORETES
 YOUNG POOR PEOPLE → MIDDLE CLASS (YOUTH) → ELITE
 YOUNG PEOPLE AMONG VICTIMS OF THE REVOLUTION
 - ✓ NOTWITHSTANDING PROMISES THE REVOLUTION DID NOT REDRESSED PROBLEMS RELATED TO UNDERDEVELOPMENT→ CONTINUOUS ENGAGEMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE (POLITICAL & SOCIAL)
 - ✓ LITERATURE ON THE THEME IS ENORMOUS



2. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DIVIDE

✓ SOCIO-ECONOMIC+REGIONAL→ RURAL EXODUS + MIGRATION

DATA: POVERTY (2010) 13.4 TUNIS (≥40.0 KASSERINE, SIDI BOUZID)

UNEMPLOYMENT (2011) 7.4 SFAX, 28.3 GAFSA (WHICH AFFECT PEOPLE WITH DIPLOMA MORE THAN DROP OUT)

1 MILLION YOUNG PEOPLE ARE ESTIMATED TO BE UNEMPLOYED AND OUTSIDE THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

✓ HOGRA & HAKIM: OPPOSITION TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE POLITICAL ELITE



✓ INABILITY BY POLITICAL PARTIES TO INTERCEPT VOTES BY YOUNG & POOR PEOPLE:

- RCD
- CLIENTELIST AND PERSONAL PARTIES → EXTREME FRAGMENTATION OF THE PERIPHERAL VOTE
- EXTREME LEFT/ISLAMIC PARTY (?)
- POPULISM (SINCE 2019): → KAIS SAYED (VOTED BY 90% OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE WHICH HOWEVER VOTED BETWEEN 15-20%)



- 3. BETWEEN POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT & SOCIAL PROTEST
- ✓ IN THE LAST YEAR MORE THAN 1235 VIOLENT EVENTS HAVE BEEN RECORDED (+530) WITH THE HIGHEST PROPORTION IN THE SOUTHWEST CORNER (TOP IN GAFSA): CLASSIFIED AS SOCIAL PROTESTS (PARTIALLY INTERCEPTED AND ENCAPSULATED BY THE UGTT BUT FOR THE MOST SPONTANEOUS)
- ✓ INCREASE IN MIGRATION (14% OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS TO ITALY ARE TUNISIAN)
- ✓ SALAFISM (DOUAR HICHER & ETTADHAMEN) → ATTRACTIVE (BUT NOT EVERYWHERE): GROUP SOCIALIZATION, COUNTERCULTURE & COUNTERNARRATIVE